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Lucie E. White and Jeremy Perelman, eds., Stones of Hope: How African Activists
Reclaim Human Rights to Challenge Global Poverty. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2011, pp. 249, $70 (cloth), $24.95 (paper).
Reviewed by Scott L. Cummings

Introduction
The defining project of law and social change scholarship has been to
answer a basic, yet fundamental, question: Can law be mobilized to contest
the power of those who have it and build the power of those who do not?
Lucie White has spent her career, both as an academic and activist,
working to illuminate the conditions under which power shifts and how
lawyers contribute to social transformation.1 One of her central concerns
has been to understand how law may be deployed to empower those whose
lives are structured—although never completely determined—by poverty,
discrimination, and despair. In this regard, White’s work has focused on
when legal action contributes to the transformation of individual and group
consciousness such that marginalized people may come to believe that change
is possible and, most crucially, that they can be the agents of that change.
White has emphasized consciousness, because it ultimately is the long-term,
on-the-ground change in ideology and practice that produces sustained
democratic transformation. Her early work, which examines change processes
both in the United States and Africa, is associated with skepticism about
traditional lawyering. White’s account of the welfare hearing of Mrs. G. is
the classic cautionary tale of how a well-intentioned but misguided lawyer
may reproduce the very client marginalization the lawyer tries to contest by
adhering too carefully to the conventional legal script.2
Over the past decade, White’s work has charted new directions.
Geographically, she has returned to Africa, developing a partnership with the
Ghana Legal Resources Center to bring Harvard Law School clinical students
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to Ghana each year to work on human rights projects related to health
care delivery. Intellectually, this work has generated new ideas about how
pragmatic economic and social rights (ESR) strategies may be used to change
consciousness, policy, and practice in an iterative and virtuous cycle. Stones
of Hope: How African Activists Reclaim Human Rights to Challenge Global Poverty is the
scholarly culmination of that project. Edited by White and Jeremy Perelman—a
former Harvard Law School S.J.D. student who worked directly on right to
health campaigns in Ghana and is now launching a clinical program at Paris’s
Sciences Po—Stones of Hope is a foundational contribution to the law and social
change field.
The book is impressive for both what it does—which I will turn to in a
moment—and how it does it—which I will begin with here. The power and
scope of the book genuinely reflect the manner in which it was conceived and
executed: as a unique collaboration across continents between scholars and
activists, who joined together out of a commitment to mutual learning in the
pursuit of social transformation. My review will focus on White and Perelman’s
central contributions for it is, of course, they who did the heavy lifting in
developing the project’s core methodological, normative, and theoretical
framework (the latter, in part, with Peter Houtzager from the Institute of
Development Studies). However, it is crucial to begin by acknowledging
the other key contributors who did the scholarly and, critically, the activist
work that constitutes the core of the project (and provides the material for the
book’s four case studies):
• Felix Morka, director of Nigeria’s Social and Economic Rights Action
Center (SERAC), who contributed a powerful case study of his
organization’s work to resist the state’s eviction of villagers to make
way for a World Bank sponsored sanitation project in Badia;
• Zackie Achmat, founder of South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign
(TAC), Mark Heywood, director of South Africa’s AIDS Law Project,
and Geoff Budlender, former director of the South African Legal
Resources Centre, who collaborated with William Forbath, from the
University of Texas, to produce the rich case study on TAC’s struggle
to create and implement a national treatment plan for persons with
HIV/AIDS;
• Helen Kijo-Bisimba, director of Tanzania’s Legal and Human Rights
Centre (LHRC), who collaborated with Osgoode Hall’s Ruth
Buchanan and the University of Toronto’s Kerry Rittich, to write the
study on community resistance to mass evictions of the Nyamuma
people from Tanzania’s Ikorongo animal reserve to make way for global
eco-tourism; and
• Mahama Ayariga, former director of Ghana’s Legal Resources Centre
(LRC), who, along with Katharine Young at the Australian National
University, and Perelman, contributed the pivotal essay on how activists
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in Nima seized upon the horrific detention of Mohammed Zakari to
advance broader access to health care in Ghana.
The outcome of this collaborative venture is a brilliantly synthetic work,
which manages to succeed on three distinct levels. First, it offers one of the
richest, most sophisticated, and contextually sensitive accounts of activist
lawyering and advocacy that exists in the field. Second, it manages, skillfully
and carefully, to derive from the rich case studies an embedded theory of social
change that extends far beyond the particularities to guide us toward a cleareyed, yet “hope”-ful account of how lawyers may help transform lives. Third,
and finally, the book is a call to action, a searing indictment of contemporary
development policy and simultaneously, a deep wellspring of inspiration for
all who care about confronting the structural underpinnings of global poverty.
It is this “third dimension” (to borrow White’s phrase3) that may well be the
most profoundly important to its authors, who have spent their careers doing
both the real-world and scholarly work of challenging the depredations of
power by building community empowerment.
The Stones of Hope Project
What is the central project of Stones of Hope? The answer to that fundamental
question is crisply asserted by its authors on the book’s very first pages: It is,
quite simply, to understand and analyze the multifaceted ways in which lawyers
and activists have, in direct engagement with different African communities,
deployed ESR strategies to challenge “the violence of radical poverty” (1).
Undertaking such a project invariably demands that one choose among a
range of approaches, all of which have unavoidable tradeoffs. A key to framing
and critically examining Stones of Hope is therefore to be clear ex ante about
which approach White and Perelman adopt and how it shapes the story that
they ultimately tell.
The primary lens through which the Stones of Hope contributors approach their
task is, in Perelman and White’s terms, one of “historical institutionalism”: a
mode of analysis that looks at how legal orders, patterns of behavior, and modes
of thinking congeal over time into taken-for-granted, normatively privileged
worldviews that structure behavior and thus prove hard to dislodge—but
(and this is the critical part) nonetheless contain contradictions that may be
exploited to redistributive ends (5–6). As one example, neoliberalism asserts
a minimalist role for the state, which may exacerbate inequality, but also
expresses fealty to the rule of law, which may create advocacy opportunities.
From this institutionalist stance, the Stones of Hope contributors weave
stories that might be best understood as accounts of interest group politics.
The picture is primarily one of organizational actors, composed of lawyers
and activists, who collaborate with community members to contest state and
corporate power through a range of ESR strategies. What this means is that, as
a methodological and analytical matter, the studies are not (generally speaking
3.
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at least) about the backgrounds, motivations, and possible contradictions of
the lawyer-activists themselves.4 Rather, they are about how organizational
actors, embedded in communities, use the legal and political levers at hand—
deploying what the authors call “strategies of engagement”—to radiate power
outward in an effort to ameliorate poverty and reform institutional practice
(7).
From Hope to Action: The Mechanics of Social Change
Viewing Stones of Hope from this institutional perspective, I want to suggest
how the mechanisms by which the book’s protagonists seek to reshape
power map onto—and in many ways challenge—fundamental critiques of
social change lawyering. In each case study, we can identify three significant
social change encounters in which the power of law is mobilized to advance
campaign objectives. These encounters occur: first, at the point of contact
between lawyers and community members, when legal and political goals are
formulated and tactics specified; second, at the point of confrontation by the
community-lawyer coalition against the state, when the community asserts
legal rights to challenge state practice; and third, at the point of remedial state
action directed back toward the community, when state power is exercised to
redress the community’s claim. In each of these encounters, power is exercised,
giving rise to tensions that form the basis for three important critiques of legal
mobilization: what I shall refer to as the critiques of lawyer accountability, of
rights, and of legal implementation. My aim here is to show how the social
change encounters illuminated in Stones of Hope correspond to these critiques—
and how the advocates in the stories seek to engage and navigate the concerns
they raise. In the end, I suggest that Stones of Hope moves us decisively beyond
the enervating progressive distrust of lawyering toward an inspirational, yet
politically grounded, model of how law may meaningfully contribute to social
change. However, in so doing, it leaves some important questions unanswered.
Specifically, while the book provides rich and innovative responses to the
critique of rights and legal implementation, it does not forcefully engage the
issue of lawyer accountability.
Let me start by sketching the mechanisms of social change embedded in
the book—what Houtzager and White refer to as the “long arc of pragmatic
ESR advocacy” (172). The Stones of Hope project is organized around four
detailed case studies: SERAC’s campaign to resist evictions in Badia, Nigeria
(17–41); TAC’s HIV/AIDS campaign in South Africa (51–90); the LHRC’s
campaign to compensate victims of evictions in Tanzania (91–121); and the
LRC health care campaign in Ghana (122–145) (note the pattern of issues:
land, health, land, health). All of these campaigns follow a particular (though
4.

In this sense, White and Perelman’s account is, for example, very different from that of
Dezalay and Garth, who are primarily interested in how lawyers’ quest for justice aligns
with their simultaneous quest for status. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Asian Legal
Revivals: Lawyers in the Shadow of Empire (Univ. of Chicago Press 2010).

Book Review: Stones of Hope

715

never precisely identical) social change logic marked by a sequence of the
three crucial encounters outlined above.
The first occurs when the lawyers encounter affected communities—Badia
in Nigeria, the broad constituency of poor South Africans with HIV/AIDS,
the Nyamuma in Tanzania, and Nima in Ghana. These encounters create
the “generative spaces” (183) in which lawyers engage community members
to (1) identify or “name” social problems; (2) “frame” the deprivation and
demand for redress in the most resonant and practically useful legal-political
lexicon; and (3) develop pragmatic advocacy responses—the “strategies of
engagement” by which the activists plan to move the campaign forward. I will
return momentarily to this first encounter, but let me briefly note a few of its
features. One, the forces that draw lawyers and communities together have
a consistently global texture: evictions pursuant to a World Bank-sponsored
project in Nigeria, the refusal of multinational drug manufacturers to permit
widespread use of generic antiretroviral drugs in South Africa, global ecotourism in Tanzania, and the impact of structural adjustment on the health
system in Ghana. Second, the focus of these encounters is to directly enlist
community members at the grassroots level in a process of mutual exchange
and education in order to activate community participation in the campaign.
The generation of movement energy and strategic planning then leads to
the second social change encounter, in which the now-formed lawyer-activistcommunity coalition intervenes in the political world to advance mutually
agreed upon goals. It is here that lawyers and communities identify the
available political and legal “hooks” to leverage pressure on state and corporate
actors to advance claims of redistributive justice. A key insight of the book is
that lawyers and activists at this stage view traditional court-centered advocacy
as one tool among many in a multifaceted political campaign. They neither
discount it nor privilege it, but instead deploy it when they think it will provide
leverage in the overall struggle. Litigation is thus a means, not an end—but still
an important means. It is in this sense that the lawyers are considered to be
engaged in “pragmatic” rights-claiming. They understand the limits of rights
strategies, but use them when they are perceived to be the best available tool—
even if they do not always succeed. Consider the invocation of rights across
the four campaigns:
• SERAC’s petition to the World Bank Inspection Panel (which resulted
in an ultimately inadequate response), followed by a federal lawsuit,
which resulted in an injunction that was disregarded.
• TAC’s successful court challenge to the South African government’s
refusal to permit the provision of antiretroviral drugs (to prevent
mother-to-child HIV/AIDS transmission) to a handful of pilot sites,
which did not overcome HIV/AIDS denialist opposition, but gave
TAC crucial leverage with reformist officials in ultimately negotiating
a clinic-focused national treatment plan. (Note here that it was the
fortuitous illness of the resistant Minister of Health that triggered
the final resolution in favor of a comprehensive national antiretroviral
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treatment plan (76). The arduous and persistent TAC campaign laid the
political and legal groundwork to take advantage of this opportunity.)
• LHRC’s petition to the Tanzania Commission on Human Rights
and Good Governance, which did not stop evictions or provide
compensation.
• And LRC’s habeas petition on behalf of Mohammed Zakari, which also
asserted a human rights claim challenging Ghana’s inadequate system
of health care funding for the poor, and ultimately led to Zakari’s
release.
It is important to highlight the following aspects of these legal campaigns.
First, the campaigns are multi-tiered in that they are targeted at venues both
inside and above the state: national courts in South Africa and Ghana, the
World Bank panel in Nigeria and internationally funded Human Rights
Commission in Tanzania. Second, the use of rights is strategically and selfconsciously geared to achieve the overall result. The advocates are sensitive to
over-claiming rights. The best example of this came out in the TAC campaign,
in which TAC framed the legal claim as a negative right—to be free of the
government’s refusal to permit antiretroviral treatment beyond pilot sites—as
opposed to an affirmative right to adequate HIV/AIDS treatment. This was
a deliberate choice that was skillfully executed, ultimately resulting in the
court accepting the negative right asserted (63). The third point is that the
rights-claiming in these campaigns is always coordinated with other tactics:
media strategies (in Badia), active political lobbying (in the TAC campaign),
petition gathering (in Zakari’s case), and civil disobedience (in all cases). The
campaigns therefore show multidimensional advocacy in full force.
In the wake of a successful ESR campaign, there is a third, iterative, encounter,
when the state mobilizes its power to bring change back to the community
level. This encounter raises two issues. One is how the state implements legal
victories; the other is how community members are continuously engaged in
the implementation process. Sometimes there simply is no implementation.
In the Tanzania example, the state disregarded the commission’s order to
compensate displaced villagers. But other times, implementation is robustly
community-based. In the TAC example, the key implementation issues were
training clinic personnel, especially in rural areas, to administer antiretroviral
treatment and educating those with HIV/AIDS on their treatment regimens.
As the authors suggest, TAC’s grassroots practice “prefigured” (189) the
institutional response in a way that enhanced implementation: TAC’s onthe-ground commitment to clinic-based and community-led antiretroviral
treatment programs was ultimately adopted as a model for South Africa’s
national HIV/AIDS treatment plan (76). In this way, a role for ongoing
community engagement was built into the policy response.
It is the power of ongoing community mobilization that is key to the Stones
of Hope analysis. The goal of these campaigns is, ultimately, to activate the
community so that they sustain the struggle for justice after the campaign
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passes. It is here that Perelman and Young’s “rights as footprints” (122–23)
notion becomes a central metaphor of the book. The assertion of rights and
the achievement of shifting power is imprinted upon the collective community
consciousness and retold in ways that sustains and re-motivates activism over
time.
From Action to Theory: The Specter of Accountability
Understanding how the arc of pragmatic advocacy occurs across these
pivotal social change encounters (lawyer–community, lawyer/community–
state, state–community) allows us to then examine how they relate to three
fundamental, and familiar, critiques about the scope and power of legal
activism. These critiques raise concerns about (1) the degree of lawyer
accountability to communities in social change contexts, (2) the political
risks of rights claiming, and (3) the effective enforcement of legal victories. I
suggest that the central theoretical contribution of Stones of Hope is to challenge
two of these critiques (of rights and legal implementation), while leaving the
third (of accountability) unanswered.
I begin by outlining how the social change encounters identified above
create the very conditions upon which the critiques are predicated. The first
encounter, in which empowered lawyers engage disempowered communities
around the project of social transformation, gives rise to the critique of
accountability. Here the familiar concern is that lawyers set the social change
agenda, make strategic decisions based on their own priorities, or privilege the
views of one sector of a broader constituency, as in Bell’s classic critique of the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.5
The second critique relates to the execution of legal strategy during the
encounter between the community, their lawyers, and the state, in which
lawyers assert rights in front of an adjudicative body with the aim of changing
law to redress the community’s grievance. In the critique of rights, this type of
rights-claiming is viewed as politically dangerous because it individualizes
grievances and thus fragments collective action by channeling it into slowmoving and demobilizing courts.6
The third critique—now at the remedial stage of state enforcement—may
be called the critique of legal implementation, which is premised upon the classic
disjunction between law on the books and law in action. Here, the concern,
captured by Scheingold’s “myth of rights”7 and Rosenberg’s “hollow hope,”8
5.
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is that judicial pronouncements do not easily translate into change on the
ground because of bureaucratic impediments to enforcement and the potential
for backlash. Therefore, lawyers may be lured into misguided legal strategies
when other forms of political action might be more effective.
What does Stones of Hope have to say about these critiques? A lot, it turns out,
about rights and implementation, but very little about accountability. Let me
address the critiques in reverse order.
With respect to the critique of legal implementation, the studies in the book
offer a rich and compelling account that both accepts this critique, but then
offers ways of moving beyond it. It is at the point of legal victory, in many
ways, that the Stones of Hope campaigns start. The campaigns are thus organized
around fulfilling the promise of the legal victory through what McCann calls
legal leveraging: negotiating policy concessions, influencing public opinion
in the media, and using the victory to stimulate grassroots energy.9 It is at the
grassroots level, then, that the hard work to implement and sustain victories
occurs. The lawyers accept this as a critical starting part of their work. They are
not bewitched by court pronouncements and lured into a false sense of law’s
formal power. To the contrary, the lawyers are self-consciously antiformalist
and pursue legal change in the context of overarching strategies of ongoing
political struggle.
There is the question of whether the lawyers and activists ultimately
succeed in this regard and here I think the record from Stones of Hope is a bit
less clear. For example, take TAC’s case. Although the case study discusses
the formulation of the national treatment plan and allocation of resources to
support it (86), we are not told in any detail how the plan has played out on
the ground. Similarly, in the Zakari case, we are told that the user fee health
care system is ultimately disregarded in favor of national health insurance,
and that LRC was involved in this process (144). But the linkage between
the campaign and this resolution is not clearly specified. Overall, we are told
that democratic and experimentalist practice on the ground presages the
institutional design of programs to come. However, just how that process
works is less clear, leaving the reader with a question: How does prefiguring
actually end up transfiguring?
When it comes to engaging the critique of rights, the book makes perhaps
its strongest contribution by moving us beyond the debilitating debate about
whether rights help or hinder movements to show how they can be used
as resources to spur political action. The central framing of the project is
“reclaiming human rights,” which suggests a deep engagement on the part of
the lawyers with the limits and risks of rights strategies and a commitment to
carrying them out with sensitivity to the pluralism of local political discourse
and rights’ potentially imperialistic overtones. It is fair to ask whether the turn
toward “pragmatic” rights claiming—which might be viewed as incrementalist
9.
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and too focused on discrete policy achievements—is ultimately the “best” form
of transformative politics. However, this type of criticism always requires an
analysis of the viability of alternative political options, without which we are
left to judge political success against an untested—and perhaps untestable—
ideal.
The book does, however, leave open some fundamental questions about
the critique of accountability. In its commitment to foregrounding the
agency and voices of the community members involved, it tends to obscure
the voices and stories of the lawyers. I suspect that this is a deliberate, and
in many ways refreshing, choice. However it is one with consequences for
our understanding of one of the ultimate advocacy objectives: community
empowerment. Generally speaking, the lawyers in the stories are hidden
behind their organizations. What are their backgrounds and motivations?
How did it come to pass that they adopted such innovative, pragmatic views of
advocacy? How did they develop and hone their strategies? By deemphasizing
the advocate, we are left to wonder about how closely their interests map onto
their clients’ interests and how accountable they might be. It is often asserted
that lawyer and community interests match up, but it is not clear how that
match was achieved and how contested it might be. For example, in the case
of Tanzania, the decision to file with the Commission on Human Rights and
Good Governance is accepted as the product of consensus, but it is not clear
what informed that decision.
More broadly, the important fact that White and Perelman, along with
other elite Harvard Law School students, were central actors in many of the
stories told in the book raises important questions about how that encounter,
across a vast expanse of space, culture, race, class, and power, was managed
and what the points of tension were. Potential divisions and tensions are
downplayed in presenting stories of advocacy and outcomes. But in so doing,
we do not learn how the tricky process of community engagement is sustained
over time. In the end, the book leaves us with a theory of change bereft of a
theory of accountability. That, of course, does not ultimately detract from its
seminal achievements, but it does raise precisely the sorts of questions and
concerns about lawyer power that White so eloquently surfaced in her early
work. Particularly to the extent that this book speaks to the next generation
of progressive lawyers eager to understand how to effectively engage poor
communities in transformative politics, it would be useful to learn more
about the processes and practices that successfully forged the Stones of Hope
collaborations.
Conclusion
In the end, of course, no book can be all things to all people and any
scholarly approach carries its own tradeoffs. We may focus on what a work
does not do only to devalue what it does. That would be a grave mistake
here, not only for those who study lawyering for social change but for those
who actually carry it out. Stones of Hope is, in the final analysis, a stunning
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achievement that lives up to its brilliantly evocative title. It is, in my view,
essential reading not only for those who care about the sociology of law, but
for all students and practitioners who care about using law to make the world
more just and humane. In this sense, Stones of Hope is a model of what legal
scholarship should be: academically rigorous and—most importantly—deeply
engaged in the project of social justice. That is the stone that we all should
carry forth.

